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Towards a reconceptualising of population ageing
in emerging markets
Stuart Gietel-Basten, Sergei Scherbov and Warren Sanderson∗
Abstract
Variously deﬁned, the ‘emerging markets’ [EMs] are frequently held up as the
countries that will shape global economic development in the 21st century. However,
it is also often said that population ageing could limit growth in many EMs. In
this paper, we explore the conventional measurements employed to demonstrate
population ageing in EMs, and then move on to discuss whether these measurements
are, indeed, ‘ﬁt for purpose’ when studying EMs. Drawing on the literature
on ‘prospective ageing’ (pioneered by Sanderson and Scherbov), we present an
alternative set of ageing measurements based on a boundary for ‘dependency’
drawn from remaining life expectancy rather than chronological age. Using these
measurements, population ageing – at least as deﬁned here – can be seen as a much
more manageable prospect for many EMs. We also examine the challenges and
the opportunities for EMs associated with population ageing, and consider their
potential advantages relative to the EU and North America in managing this trend.
1 Background
1.1 What are ‘emerging markets’?
As is implied by the name, ‘emerging markets’ [EMs] are generally deﬁned as
countries in a transitional phase towards developing a full market economy based on
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industrial modes of production and greater economic freedom. However, the term
‘emerging markets’, which was ﬁrst coined by Antoine van Agtmael in 1981, is by
no means uncontroversial. While it was initially seen as a more dynamic alternative
to the expression ‘third world’ and to the politically incorrect term ‘less-developed
countries’, the ‘emerging markets’ label has been questioned in terms of both its
composition and its meaning. Organisations like Standard & Poors, the FTSE, the
IMF, and Dow Jones have used diﬀerent criteria in deﬁning what constitutes an
emerging market.
One deﬁnition of an emerging market, provided by Vladimir Kvint (2008; 2009),
is as follows:
An Emerging Market is a society transitioning from a dictatorship
to a free-market-oriented-economy, with increasing economic freedom,
gradual integration with the Global Marketplace and with other
members of the GEM (Global Emerging Market), an expanding middle
class, improving standards of living, social stability and tolerance, as
well as an increase in cooperation with multilateral institutions.
Alternative groupings of countries and acronyms for these categories have
recently gained currency, including the term ‘BRICS’, an acronym for Brazil,
Russia, India, and China (and, in some cases, South Africa). BRICS, which was
ﬁrst coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim O’Neill, is thus used to
refer to four (or ﬁve) large countries that are expected to play increasingly critical
roles in shaping the global economy. More recently, the BRICS countries have been
joined by the ‘MINT’ countries: namely, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey.
Finally, the London Stock Exchange divides the ‘emerging markets’ category of
countries into ‘advanced emerging’, ‘secondary emerging’, and ‘frontier’ markets.
In this paper, we use a special subset of 21 EMs for analysis, grouped into four
quasi-regions.1 Clearly, there are many question marks over the inclusion of some
countries and the exclusion of others. However, we believe that the creation of this
subset represents a reasonable attempt at assembling a group of countries that are
broadly expected to play very signiﬁcant roles in shaping the global economy in the
21st century.
1.2 Population ageing in emerging markets: The orthodox view
In addition to undergoing dramatic economic and political changes, EMs have
experienced equally seismic demographic changes over the past 50 years. As
Figure 1 shows, across the EMs there have been marked increases in life expectancy
1 China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand (East, South-East, and
South Asia); Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru (Latin America); Egypt, Jordan,
Tunisia and Turkey (Middle East and North Africa); Poland, Russia, and South Africa (other).
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Figure 1:
Recent trends and forecasts of life expectancy at birth in four groups of EM countries.
[a] Latin America; [b] E/SE/S Asia; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Source: UNPD 2013
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Figure 2:
Survivorship (lx) curve, Turkey, 1950–2060
Source: UNPD 2013.
at birth for both males and females – albeit with some important outliers, such as
South Africa and Russia, where previous mortality improvements have been thrown
into reverse over the past two decades. Large shares of these overall improvements
in life expectancy have been driven by reductions in mortality rates among infants
and children (see Caselli et al. 2014 and Garbero and Pamuk 2014 for a review) and
an increasing rectangularisation of the survival curve. Looking at Figure 2, we can
see this pattern for Turkey: while the country saw dramatic improvements in early-
age mortality during the mid-20th century, lower mortality at older ages has driven
the overall mortality improvements in Turkey in recent years, and is projected to
continue to do so in the future. Despite this caveat, as Figure 3 shows, there have
been equally large improvements in life expectancy at age 60 for both males and
females (again, with the same notable outliers). Thus, it is inaccurate to simply say
that mortality improvements among older people have led to a trend towards ‘ageing
from above’ in EMs. Rather, the recent improvements in mortality and health over
the entire life course have led to increased survivorship rates; and, hence, to rising
numbers of people surviving to older ages. Most of the scholarly literature, including
a recent survey of population experts (see, for example, Caselli et al. 2014 and
Garbero and Pamuk 2014) has forecasted that these mortality improvements will
continue into the medium term.
It has also been argued that EM populations have ‘aged from below’ as a
consequence of rapid declines in fertility. The often dramatic decreases in fertility
can be seen in Figure 4. In 1950, all of the EMs in our dataset with the exception of
Poland, Russia, and Argentina had total fertility rates [TFRs] above ﬁve, with all but
three having TFRs above six. Today, only Pakistan, the Philippines, and Jordan have
TFRs above three. Meanwhile, Thailand, China, Tunisia, Poland, Russia, Malaysia,
Chile, and Brazil, all have TFRs below the replacement level; with China having
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Figure 3:
Recent trends and forecasts of life expectancy at age 60 in four groups of EM
countries. [a] Latin America; [b] E/SE/S Asia; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Source: UNPD 2013.
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Figure 4:
Recent trends and forecasts of total fertility rates [TFR] in four groups of EM
countries. [a] Latin America; [b] E/SE/S Asia; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Medium fertility variant used.
Source: UNPD 2013.
one of the lowest fertility rates in the world. In India, 10 states currently have TFRs
below two (for an overview of these recent trends, see Basten et al. 2014 and Goujon
and Fuchs 2014). While the scale of the decline in fertility across the country set is
very large, the pace at which this decrease has occurred – especially when compared
to the trends in European countries, where the fertility decline began over a century
ago – is breathtaking. It is therefore clear that the process of ‘ageing from below’ as
a consequence of fertility decline has contributed substantially to the overall ageing
of the populations in EMs.
Future patterns of fertility are, however, more uncertain. In Figure 4, we
employed the medium variant of the UN’s World Population Prospects: 2012
Revision. Yet in the literature and in a recent survey of experts, some scepticism
about this indicator have been expressed. While space does not permit a full review
of this debate here, it is important to note that the UN’s assumptions regarding
fertility are not universally accepted. The main points of contention are concerning
the future paths of countries (such as China and Thailand) that are currently
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Figure 5:
Recent trends and forecasts of the total population size aged 65+ in four groups of
EM countries. [a] Latin America; [b] E/SE/S Asia; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Medium fertility variant used.
Source: UNPD 2013.
characterised by very low fertility (see Basten et al. 2014 and Goujon and Fuchs
2014 for a review).
So how do these trends aﬀect population ageing? First, we might consider the
‘absolute’ increases in the older population. Using the standard measurements
employed by the UN and most scholarly and policy documents, Figure 5 shows
the absolute increase in the total population aged 65 or older based upon an index of
100 in 1950. It would be fair to say that the increases are dramatic in all countries,
although some are certainly more dramatic than others. For example, in Jordan and
in Turkey the shares of the population aged 65+ are projected to increase more than
90-fold relative to the shares in 1950. Meanwhile, in Latin America and in Asia,
increases of 20-fold and 30-fold are anticipated. What is crucial to note, however,
is that the bulk of these increases are expected to occur in the next few decades;
causing the increases that occurred in the 20th century to appear relatively modest
by comparison.
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Figure 6:
Recent trends and forecasts of the old-age dependency ratio (population aged
65+/population aged 20–64) in four groups of EM countries. [a] Latin America;
[b] E/SE/S Asia; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Medium fertility variant used.
Source: UNPD 2013.
However, in thinking about the management of population ageing, it is arguably
more useful to consider the size of the older population relative to the sizes other age
groups – and especially to the size of the population of ‘working ages’. In making
such comparisons, the old-age dependency ratio [OADR] is the ‘go-to’ measurement
that is almost universally employed in scholarly, policy, and popular discourses on
ageing. The sheer ubiquity of the OADR in the scholarly and the policy literature
does not need to be demonstrated here. In the OADR, the population aged 65 or
older counts as the numerator, while the population aged between a given lower
bound (assumed to be 20 here) and 64 is the denominator. The people aged 65+
are deemed to be ‘old’ and ‘dependent’ upon those aged 20–64, who might be
considered to be a sort of de facto labour force. The OADRs for the EM countries
are displayed in Figure 6. The numbers represent the number of ‘old people’ who
are ‘dependent’ upon each person aged (in this case) 20–64.
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Looking at these OADRs, it is not diﬃcult to see why population ageing is
considered to be such a signiﬁcant issue, or is even characterised as a threat: in
the EMs, the OADRs are on track to increase sharply over the coming decades.
Currently, the OADRs are below 0.17 for all of the EMs in our set except Argentina,
Chile, Poland, and Russia. In other words, each person aged 20–64 is currently
‘supporting’ no more than 0.17 people aged 65+ in these countries. Meanwhile,
the ratio is much higher in some non-EM countries: the OADR is 0.39 in Japan;
and is between 0.30 and 0.35 in Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Greece. Among the
EMs, the highest current OADRs are 0.24 in Poland, 0.20 in Russia, and 0.20 in
Argentina. Although Chile and Thailand have OADRs of 0.17 and 0.16, respectively;
South Africa, Egypt, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, Tunisia, Turkey, Brazil and China
have OADRs of between 0.10 and 0.15 (in ascending order). Jordan, the Philippines,
Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, and India have current OADRs of between 0.07 and
below 0.1 (again, in ascending order).
But by mid-century, these ratios look very diﬀerent. In the Latin American EMs,
there is a near uniform increase to between 0.39 (Peru) and 0.56 (Chile), with most
of the OADRs clustered between 0.4 and 0.5. In E/SE/S Asia, China, and Thailand,
the OADRs are projected to increase extremely rapidly and intensely, to between
0.54 and 0.65. Indeed, by 2050 the population of Thailand will be as ‘old’ as the
populations of Germany and Singapore. Elsewhere in this region, the OADR is
projected to rise to 0.37 in Malaysia and to between 0.20 and 0.29 in the remaining
countries. Among the MENA EMs, the OADR is set to jump to 0.53 in Tunisia
and to 0.45 in Turkey. Increases of 150% are projected for Egypt and Jordan. In the
‘other’ group, the OADR is expected to further increase to 0.40 in Russia and to 0.62
in Poland, and to double in South Africa.
Yet before we discuss the ‘challenges’ associated with population ageing, as
indicated by the OADR; we would be well advised to pause and think a little more
carefully about what this widely used measurement is actually telling us. Indeed, a
growing body of literature has developed in recent years suggesting that the OADR
might not be such a useful measurement when examining population ageing in
industrialised/OECD countries. The reasons why this might be the case have been
extensively reviewed elsewhere (see, for example, Scherbov et al. 2014; Sanderson
and Scherbov 2013; and Spijker and MacInnes 2014), and will be only very brieﬂy
summarised here. There are two main criticisms of the reliance on the OADR. The
ﬁrst criticism concerns change over time: i.e., when the boundary of ‘old age’ and
‘dependency’ is ﬁxed at age 65 over the complete forecast period, changes in life
expectancy (and, by implication, health) are not taken into account. The second
criticism is rather more fundamental, and challenges the very idea of what it means
to be ‘old’ and ‘dependent’, regardless of which threshold age is chosen. The
literature that has made this criticism has drawn on themes such as the separation of
the pensionable age and the retirement age (which rarely occurs at 65); diﬀerences
in health care expenditures among people aged 65 and older; the need to consider
diﬀerences in pension systems (and their increasing privatisation); and issues related
to ‘active ageing’, including a questioning of the notion of ‘dependency’.
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Elsewhere, Basten (2013) has argued that these criticisms are even more pertinent
when considering non-European settings. For example, in Asian countries with very
low levels of pension coverage and of state-provided support for older people –
problems that are exacerbated by the large informal labour markets in many of
these countries – the challenges relating to ‘dependency’ that the OADR implies
are not adequately reﬂected. Again, even in countries that have pension systems,
workers may be eligible to receive beneﬁts before reaching age 65. Moreover, the
existing systems diﬀer in their levels of susceptibility to population ageing. For
example, provident fund pension systems tend to be less vulnerable than pay-as-
you-go systems.
While the EM country set is certainly heterogeneous in character, we suggest that
there is a strong argument for reassessing the use of the OADR as the default/sole
measurement of population ageing. In doing so, we must think carefully about
what concerns us about population ageing, and about what precisely we mean by
dependency. In the OECD context, we might think of dependency in terms of
a tax-paying, formalised labour force transferring assets to an inactive, ‘retired’
population via the pension system and/or the medical/social care system.
First, we must consider the role of pensions. Again, this is not the place for an
exhaustive review of the pension systems in the EM country set under analysis
here (see Clements et al. 2014, and for reviews, see ssa.gov 2013a for Asia;
ssa.gov 2013b for Latin America; ssa.gov 2014a for Africa and ssa.gov 2014b
for Europe); not least because of the fast-changing, heterogeneous nature of these
systems both between and within such countries, and given the complex web of
conditions and eligibility criteria. Generally, however, we can state that pension
provision in EMs is characterised by much lower replacement rates, lower levels of
coverage, lower contribution levels, and stricter eligibility criteria than in EU states
(although important exceptions exist, particularly in Latin America and Poland – see
ssa.gov 2014a and 2014b; OECD 2013). Thus, in most of these countries, public
pension expenditures represent a relatively small percentage of GDP (e.g., 0.7% in
Pakistan and Indonesia compared to an OECD average of 8.4%). Furthermore, the
pension systems that exist tend to diﬀer from the PAYG systems of many European
countries. For example, countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia have provident
fund-type systems that rely less on intergenerational transfers, and are instead based
primarily on fund/stock market performance. Thus, these systems are arguably less
susceptible to population ageing. Finally, with the exception of most of the Latin
American countries and Poland, the retirement age is signiﬁcantly lower in the EMs
than in the majority of European states, which suggests that there is a degree of
leeway for future reform – a point we shall return to later. Indeed, if we were to take
the age of pension eligibility as the boundary of old age and dependency, as implied
by the European/historical context (see Sanderson and Scherbov 2013 and Basten
et al. 2013 for a review); then a recalculated OADR would be signiﬁcantly higher,
and the sense that an ‘ageing crisis’ is occurring would be further exacerbated.
The second major concern raised in the literature relating to the ‘problem’
of population ageing is the potential growth in health care expenditures. Again,
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a comprehensive review of EM health care systems is not possible here (see,
for example, WEF 2014), but some general points regarding the quality, the
accessibility, and the funding of health care can be broadly made. In the WHO’s
2010 ranking of world health systems, only Colombia ranks in the top 25, with
Chile and Argentina ranking 33rd and 34th, respectively; although it should be
noted that the per capita public expenditures on health in these Latin American
EMs are relatively high. Even in EMs with nascent (or established) universal health
care systems, the systems of long-term social care for the elderly tend to be weak
(e.g., Deloitte 2014). Crucially, however, in both OECD and EM countries, health
care expenditures are much more strongly correlated with proximity to death rather
than with reaching a particular age (see Gray 2005 for a review). In other words,
the number of people aged 65 and older only becomes truly relevant in terms of
projected health care expenditures when considered in relation to the overarching
mortality patterns (see Spijker and MacInnes 2014 for an example from the UK).
In making these two observations about the state of pension and health care
provision in EMs, it important to note that we recognise that an unfair comparison
is being made with Europe and with various other OECD countries. However, this is
precisely the point. Much of the current framing of the ‘ageing crisis’ – and, indeed,
the tendency to measure it using the OADR – is viewed through the lens of large-
scale, formalised, post-industrial economies with very high levels of human capital,
and in which very large transfers have historically taken place at around age 65.
These conditions are very diﬀerent in EMs, yet we often conceptualise ageing in
these countries as occurring in similar ways.
A ﬁnal point that relates to the notion of being ‘dependent’ after turning 65 refers
to the literature on ‘productive ageing’. In many OECD countries, this discourse is
largely based around a narrative of ‘active ageing’, and of the contributions made by
‘older’/retired people to civil society through voluntary activities, or to their families
through child care arrangements (see, for example, Avramov and Maskova 2003).
These notions have been mentioned in the literature on EM countries as well (see
various chapters in Morrow-Howell and Mui 2012, especially Du and Yang 2012
for China). Yet another feature of active engagement in later life should also be
highlighted: namely, labour force participation [LFP] among people aged 65+. As
Figure 7 shows, LFP among this age group is generally much higher in EMs than
in other European/industrialised economies. For males, the LFP rates are above
50% in Indonesia and Peru; above 40% in Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, and the
Philippines, and above 20% in Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and Turkey. Female LFP
rates are signiﬁcantly lower, primarily because women have less access than men to
employment.
While the active ageing agenda in OECD countries has largely been seen as a
‘positive’ challenge to activate older human and social capital, these higher LFP
rates in EMs are not necessarily a positive sign. Indeed, as is frequently the case
in many EM labour markets as a whole, large percentages of the elderly workforce
are engaged in poorly paid labour in the informal sector, either as casual workers or
as self-employed individuals in low skilled or unskilled occupations. As Amireddy
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Figure 7:
Labour force participation among 65–69-year-olds, selected EMs, various surveys,
2010–2013
Source: ILOSTAT 2014.
(2013) noted, ‘this suggests that given the inadequate social security for the majority
of the older persons and the declining traditional support from adult children with
the growth of nuclear families, continuing to work can be the only option for old
age support for the majority in India’. However, it is not our place here to make a
normative judgement as to the nature of elderly labour force engagement in EMs.
Instead, our aim is merely to demonstrate that it is common for people in these
countries to continue to work after age 65, and that the problem of ‘dependency’
among people aged 65+ might therefore be less acute than expected.
1.3 An alternative approach: Thinking prospectively?
Figure 8 provides an alternative approach to thinking about the relationship
between increases in life expectancy and diﬀerent time elements across the life
course. Crucially, it helps to picture the diﬀerence between chronological age and
prospective age. Chronological age refers to the number of years a person has lived,
while prospective age refers to the number of years a person is expected to live. As
Ryder (1975, p. 16) remarked: ‘To the extent that our concern with age is what it
signiﬁes about the degree of deterioration and dependence, it would seem sensible
to consider the measurement of age not in terms of years elapsed since birth but
rather in terms of the number of years remaining until death’. This approach guides
our exercise here. Looking at the graph, we can see that at the centre is the index
(set at 2010) of both chronological and prospective age. Keeping remaining life
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Figure 8:
Trajectories of constant prospective ages (α-ages) over time, Turkey, males (standard
2010)
Source: authors calculations based on UNPD 2013.
expectancy [RLE] constant, we can see why a 60-year-old – in this example, a man
in Turkey – with a RLE of 60 in 2010 would be equivalent to a 67-year-old in 2060,
and to a 53-year-old in 1960. In other words, when we compare the life expectancies
of men in Turkey over this 50-year period, the expression ‘40 is the new 30’ seems
to apply. But for the older population under analysis here, we could say that ‘70
is the new 65’; and that by 2050, ‘65 is the new 60’. Aside from life expectancy,
it is highly likely that the health status of these three ‘older men’ are going to
be entirely diﬀerent when their age is measured chronologically. This concept has
been elucidated at length elsewhere by Sanderson and Scherbov and others. For
an extended discussion of prospective age, please see, for example, Scherbov et al.
(2014), Sanderson and Scherbov (2013, 2007 and 2005), Basten (2013), and Spijker
and Macinnes (2014).
Sanderson and Scherbov have developed a number of new methods for measuring
age that take these changes in life expectancy into account. In estimating the
‘prospective old age dependency ratio’ [POADR], a ﬁxed RLE must ﬁrst be
established. The RLE is set at the point at which a person is deﬁned as ‘old’ or
‘dependent’. This point then changes as total life expectancy increases (or decreases)
(see Figures 1 and 3).
Various studies (e.g., Basten et al. 2013) have tried to identify a suitable RLE
reﬂecting the boundary at which the ﬁnal period of dependency begins. However,
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as suggested above, before we can deﬁne the RLE, we must ﬁrst engage in a
fundamental reappraisal of what we mean by ‘old’ and ‘dependent’; and, indeed,
determine much more precisely what it is we want to measure. In the literature,
there is a general consensus that the RLE should be 10–15 years. Sanderson and
Scherbov (2010) have suggested basing this boundary on an RLE of 15 years
[hereafter RLE15], as this was the remaining life expectancy of 65-year-olds in
many low mortality countries in the 1960s and the 1970s. This ﬁgure can then
be compared with earlier conceptualisations of what it means to be ‘dependent’.
More importantly, however, based on international evidence of health and social
care expenditures (see, for example, Zweifel et al. 1999 and Gray 2005), we can
assume that ill health, morbidity, and the need for long-term care are most likely
to fall within this period of life. Thus, RLE is deﬁned as a period of ‘physical
dependency’ during which people are likely to need expensive forms of care.
In the remainder of this paper, we will ﬁrst calculate the age at which RLE
equals 15, and present this as an alternative ‘boundary’ for the construction of
‘dependency’. Using this new boundary, we will then proceed to calculate a new
series of dependency ratios. These ‘prospective’ old-age dependency ratios could
be seen as alternatives to the traditional old-age dependency ratio.
2 Data and methods
For this exercise, we utilise the input data from the UN’s World population
prospects: 2012 revision, including the UN life tables (lx) that are graduated to
single years of age and time. We use single year population totals based upon the
medium fertility variant of the UN’s projections. For a critique of these assumptions,
see the discussion section below.
To recap, we compare the POADR and the OADR with the formulas below:
OADR =
number of people aged 65 and over
number of people aged 15–64
POADR =
number of people ≥ age at RLE = 15
number of people aged ≥ 20 and ≤ age at RLE = 15
The results will be presented for each EM country grouped into four quasi-regions.
The limitations of a universal application of this dataset to all countries under
analysis here are addressed in the discussion section below.
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3 Results
3.1 RLE15 as a new boundary of ‘dependency’ in EMs
As Figures 9a–d demonstrate, the ages at which the RLE15 begins clearly diﬀer
signiﬁcantly both temporally and spatially, and are largely determined by the recent
histories of mortality patterns in the respective EMs. We can immediately see that
the dramatic recent (and projected) improvements in mortality are radically altering
the age at which the RLE15 begins. Returning to the prospective ages presented for
Turkey in Figure 8, we can see that Turkey is far from being an isolated example.
When we look at the Latin American EMs, we can comfortably argue that in Chile,
for example, ‘70 is the new 65’, and that by the end of the forecast period, ‘76 will be
the new 70’. Such scenarios can be presented throughout the dataset. If, for example,
we compare in Tunisia life expectancies 30 years in the past with life expectancies
30 years in the future, we can say that ‘70 is the new 60’.
Thus, it is clear that there is little justiﬁcation for using 65 as a pivotal ‘boundary
year’ after which a person enters a period of ‘old age’ and ‘dependency’, based
on the construction of dependency outlined above. For some countries, the age at
which the RLE15 begins has been well above age 65 for two or even three decades.
In the E/SE/S Asian EMs, the age at which the RLE at age 65 became greater than
15 years was reached in Thailand in the early 1980s, in China in the early 2000s, and
in Malaysia very recently (Figure 9a). In the Latin American EMs, for example, all
of the countries had passed this point by the early 1990s (Figure 9b). When we look
at the remaining EMs, we see that this threshold was broken in the past 15 years
in Jordan, Tunisia, Turkey, and Poland (Figures 9c–d). This indicates that for these
countries, the ‘boundary’ of ‘dependency’ was set too low in the past, based on this
particular construction of dependency. The natural corollary of assumption is that
for the period until the age at which RLE15 starts exceeded 65, the ‘boundary’ of
‘dependency’ had been set too low for these countries.
But what about the countries for which the RLE15 still starts below age 65?
For example, in the E/SE/S Asian EMs, the age at which the RLE15 starts is not
projected to rise above 65 until the mid-2020s in Indonesia, the early 2040s in India
and in the Philippines, and the early 2060s in Pakistan. Elsewhere, the age at which
the RLE15 starts is forecast to rise above 65 in Egypt in the late 2020s, in Russia
in the mid-2030s, and in South Africa in the early 2040s. Thus, the implication
here is that based on this particular construction of dependency, the ‘boundary’ of
‘dependency’ is set too high in our forecasts until this point is reached.
In sum, if we consider RLE15 as an alternative ‘boundary’ of ‘dependency’ based
upon a set of assumptions about the concentration of ill health and other care
needs, it becomes clear that the persistent use of the chronological age of 65 as
a boundary does not reﬂect the dynamic nature of shifting patterns of mortality and
life expectancy.
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Figure 9:
The age at which RLE15 begins in four groups of EM countries. [a] E/SE/S Asia;
[b] Latin America; [c] MENA; [d] Others
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Source: authors calculations based on UNPD 2013.
3.2 Prospective old-age dependency ratios for EMs
As we noted above, Sanderson and Scherbov have developed an alternative set
of measurements that translate the shifting patterns of RLE15 as a ‘boundary’
of ‘dependency’ into a ratio. As we explained above, the prospective old-age
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Figure 10a:
Comparing OADR with POADR in four groups of EM countries. [a] E/SE/S Asia;
[b] Latin America; [c] MENA; [d] Others
dependency ratio [POADR] takes the denominator as a ﬁxed lower bounded age
(here, 20 chronological years of age) through to a dynamically changing upper
bound eﬀectively set at the point at which the RLE is 16 years. The numerator is
taken to be the entire population aged at or above the age in the life table at which the
RLE is (or is forecast to be) 15 years. Figures 10a–d compare the ‘standard’ OADR
with the POADR calculated for each EM country. (Note that the complete schedules
of OADR and POADR for all EMs are reproduced in Appendix A. Furthermore, for
purposes of comparison, an abridged dataset of POADRs for other countries can be
downloaded from this website).
Each of the Latin American EMs is characterised by signiﬁcant gaps between the
OADRs and the recalculated POADRs, largely due to the relatively low fertility rates
coupled with strong improvements in mortality patterns in these countries. By the
end of the forecast period, the OADRs in Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru
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Figure 10b:
are around twice as high as the POADRs, with this multiple rising to around 2.5 in
Brazil and to almost 3.0 in Chile.
In E/SE/S Asia, the picture is more mixed. In Thailand, there is a large diﬀerence
between the forecast OADR and the POADR owing to this country’s very low
fertility rate and improvements in mortality. More modest diﬀerences can be found
in Indonesia, Malaysia, and China. However, given China’s population size and
economic power, even a relatively modest diﬀerence in the ‘dependency ratio’ could
have important ramiﬁcations not just for China itself, but for the region as a whole.
The diﬀerences between the OADR and the POADR are much smaller in the other
EMs in the region, even at the end of the forecast period. In Pakistan and the
Philippines, the pace of population ageing is relatively slow due to persistently high
fertility rates, and the diﬀerences between the ratios are also small. A ﬁnal point
regarding national heterogeneity should be made here. In all of the countries in
this region – indeed, in all of the EMs – there are important regional diﬀerences
in fertility and mortality levels and in migration patterns; and, hence, in degrees of
population ageing. It is important to keep this regional heterogeneity in mind when
Stuart Gietel-Basten, Sergei Scherbov and Warren Sanderson 59
Figure 10c:
considering the world’s two population ‘billionaires’: China and India. Given their
sheer size and the power exercised by their provincial-level governments, we can
expect to observe substantial regional variation within China and India.
The MENA EMs also represent something of a ‘mixed bag.’ In both Tunisia and
Turkey, there are very large diﬀerences between the POADRs and the OADRs by
mid-century, with the prospective-based ratio being roughly half as large as the
OADRs. Again, these gaps are largely attributable to the relatively low fertility rates
and strong improvements in mortality in these counties. In Jordan and Egypt, by
contrast, higher fertility rates and worse mortality conditions result in lower overall
OADRs; and thus in smaller, but still notable, gaps between the OADRs and the
POADRs.
Finally, in the category of ‘other EMs’, we again see large diﬀerences. Low
fertility and mortality improvements in Poland lead to rapid ageing under the OADR
measurement: i.e., to a ratio of 0.65 by 2050. However, under a scenario using
prospective calculations, this increase is much more modest, from around 0.18 today
to 0.35 by mid-century. Russia’s very poor mortality track record contributes to the
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Figure 10d:
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia, and ZAF = South Africa (Other).
Source: authors calculations based on UNPD 2013.
relatively modest diﬀerences between the OADR and the POADR in that country.
Finally, in South Africa, relatively high fertility and relatively poor mortality
conditions lead to lower overall rates of ageing.
A ﬁnal point can be made that links back to the previous discussion on setting
the RLE at 15 years. For a large number of the analysed countries, the POADR had
been higher than the OADR in the recent past. Indeed, in some countries (Egypt,
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, South Africa, and Russia), the POADR is still higher
than the OADR today; albeit usually by very modest amounts. This implies that
based on our construction of dependency, ageing may have been ‘undermeasured’
in the past when the OADR alone was used.
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4 Discussion
There are, of course, a large number of limitations to our exercise. The ﬁrst concerns
the ‘independent’ population, or the denominator. For consistency, we set the lower
bound at 20 years of chronological age across the entire country set. It, is, however,
clear that this cut-oﬀ point is much more appropriate for some countries rather than
for others. Compare, for example, Pakistan and Brazil, where the 2010 labour force
participation rates of males aged 15–19 were higher than 50%; with Russia and
Poland, where the same rates were lower than 10% (ILOSTAT 2014). The second
concern relating to the calculation of the denominator is that the ‘nature’ of these
denominators could diﬀer across the EMs, as this denominator is weakly deﬁned
not only in our calculations, but also in the OADR. In assuming that the total
number of people between age 20 and > RLE15 represent a de facto labour force,
we do not take into account the very diﬀerent characteristics of these ‘working-aged’
populations across this rather heterogeneous group of EMs. For example, countries
diﬀer in the degree to which their labour market is formalised, and in their levels of
labour force participation, particularly among women. Moreover, it is clear that the
structural issues surrounding pensions and old-age care liabilities are not the same
across countries. As we noted in the background section above, we need to account
for diﬀerences across countries not only in the types of pensions that are prevalent,
but in current levels of liability for pension and care provision.
A second point of criticism lies in the deﬁnition and use of RLE15 as a boundary
for ‘dependency’. First, there is clearly an issue relating to the creation of binary
‘dependent’ and ‘independent’ populations. Just as proponents of the OADR are
foolish to assume that people become ‘old’ and ‘dependent’ upon reaching their
65th birthday, proponents of the POADR could very well be open to the same charge
for assuming that people become dependent upon reaching the age at which RLE
equals 15 years. Second, setting the RLE at 15 years is arbitrary, and is based on
relatively little solid empirical evidence. Third, by applying this boundary across
the entire population, diﬀerences in health and mortality (by, for example, gender,
occupation, and class) are ignored. The importance of this problem is emphasised
in Sanderson and Scherbov 2014, which utilises survey data to measure the speed
of ageing across population subgroups in the US. Fourth, the use of RLE15 over the
entire projection period does not allow for further delays in the onset of morbidity
and ill health, and thus for a potential decrease in the number of years spent in
so-called ‘dependency’.
The ﬁnal criticism revolves around the assumptions employed in the exercise.
Again, for consistency, we have used the latest UN World Population Prospects for
all countries. Assumptions regarding future improvements in mortality are taken
for granted here, even though these improvements may not occur. However, the
scholarly consensus regarding the fertility assumptions employed by the UN –
especially in settings characterised by very low fertility – is much less solid (see,
for example, Basten et al. 2014).
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While all of these limitations are signiﬁcant, it is also important to note that we
do not intend to present these alternative measurements of population ageing as
some kind of panacea. In the ﬁrst section of the paper, we demonstrated why the
conventional means of measuring population ageing using the old-age dependency
ratio is increasingly obsolete in Europe and North America, and – arguably, even
more so – in many EMs.
In the current paper, we have attempted to present just one of the alternative
approaches that could be used to study (and measure) population ageing and
‘dependency’ in EMs. This alternative measurement is just another tool that can be
added to the demographer’s toolkit, and that can be recommended to policy-makers
and other stakeholders in EMs. If this measurement approach empowers policy-
makers to take a more ‘rational’ view of population ageing – i.e., a perspective
that takes into account improvements in health and longevity, and that guides them
away from a worst-case scenario of a seemingly unavoidable future characterised
by intense and rapid population ageing, as the OADR projections tend to show – and
thus to avoid ‘policy paralysis’, then it will prove useful.
Finally, the real contribution of these alternative measurements is that they might
lead policy-makers and other stakeholders in EMs to think much more carefully and
deeply about what the precise challenges of an ageing population actually are. Only
by designing and executing improved measurements can demographers identify
where the future stresses might lie in diﬀerent scenarios of population ageing. Since
the EM economies are, by their very nature, ‘emerging’, the future implications of
an ageing population are likely to be very diﬀerent in these countries than in the
OECD or the EU countries. Arguably, the EMs still have substantial opportunities
for harnessing the demographic dividend. For example, they could formalise the
labour market (which would increase contributions to existing pension systems
and help in the development of future social welfare programs); they could further
develop their human capital and their technological assets (to increase productivity);
and they could encourage the provision of services through the private sector. In
sum, if we compare the EMs with the countries of Europe, we can see that the
current nature of ageing and of ‘dependency’ (and the boundaries of ‘old age’ and
‘dependency’) diﬀer considerably between them, but so does the outlook for the
future.
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Appendix: OADR and POADR for EMs, a subset of countries
Country Measure 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 2020 2030 2040 2050
ARG POADR 0.165 0.169 0.159 0.145 0.143 0.142 0.150 0.159 0.184
BRA POADR 0.102 0.088 0.079 0.081 0.081 0.089 0.113 0.149 0.183
CHL POADR 0.116 0.098 0.092 0.091 0.093 0.104 0.134 0.184 0.213
CHN POADR 0.127 0.122 0.122 0.119 0.126 0.160 0.213 0.297 0.314
COL POADR 0.099 0.086 0.078 0.075 0.077 0.089 0.118 0.152 0.176
EGY POADR 0.129 0.131 0.135 0.124 0.126 0.125 0.135 0.137 0.156
IDN POADR 0.126 0.112 0.111 0.102 0.103 0.115 0.149 0.191 0.225
IND POADR 0.135 0.133 0.123 0.114 0.116 0.130 0.151 0.173 0.198
JOR POADR 0.110 0.101 0.076 0.068 0.067 0.070 0.083 0.110 0.148
MEX POADR 0.085 0.074 0.071 0.071 0.073 0.078 0.099 0.127 0.172
MYS POADR 0.105 0.089 0.082 0.085 0.089 0.101 0.129 0.153 0.175
PAK POADR 0.110 0.106 0.106 0.102 0.099 0.097 0.114 0.132 0.166
PER POADR 0.110 0.088 0.081 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.097 0.120 0.150
PHL POADR 0.106 0.092 0.090 0.092 0.094 0.108 0.124 0.136 0.149
POL POADR 0.190 0.194 0.192 0.171 0.165 0.191 0.261 0.263 0.289
RUS POADR 0.184 0.196 0.268 0.217 0.217 0.255 0.308 0.293 0.322
THA POADR 0.086 0.073 0.087 0.105 0.108 0.127 0.187 0.264 0.332
TUN POADR 0.120 0.109 0.114 0.106 0.102 0.111 0.148 0.187 0.222
TUR POADR 0.122 0.101 0.110 0.107 0.104 0.106 0.128 0.158 0.198
ZAF POADR 0.146 0.117 0.107 0.142 0.138 0.143 0.147 0.142 0.161
ARG OADR 0.155 0.175 0.186 0.190 0.193 0.209 0.237 0.273 0.343
BRA OADR 0.091 0.089 0.101 0.117 0.126 0.155 0.221 0.294 0.396
CHL OADR 0.113 0.112 0.129 0.153 0.164 0.201 0.302 0.388 0.449
CHN OADR 0.105 0.106 0.116 0.127 0.133 0.181 0.262 0.380 0.425
COL OADR 0.088 0.088 0.090 0.100 0.108 0.138 0.197 0.254 0.314
EGY OADR 0.102 0.104 0.111 0.103 0.107 0.115 0.140 0.158 0.210
IDN OADR 0.081 0.078 0.086 0.089 0.091 0.107 0.152 0.212 0.269
IND OADR 0.078 0.080 0.085 0.092 0.094 0.108 0.136 0.166 0.208
JOR OADR 0.088 0.086 0.068 0.066 0.067 0.076 0.103 0.151 0.221
MEX OADR 0.094 0.095 0.097 0.110 0.115 0.141 0.189 0.273 0.353
MYS OADR 0.079 0.073 0.073 0.084 0.091 0.112 0.160 0.205 0.275
PAK OADR 0.088 0.089 0.090 0.088 0.086 0.084 0.101 0.120 0.155
PER OADR 0.084 0.085 0.095 0.111 0.116 0.133 0.174 0.233 0.304
PHL OADR 0.076 0.069 0.068 0.073 0.075 0.091 0.114 0.134 0.159
POL OADR 0.178 0.176 0.206 0.208 0.222 0.295 0.385 0.423 0.554
RUS OADR 0.171 0.171 0.203 0.199 0.197 0.236 0.305 0.304 0.360
THA OADR 0.082 0.083 0.109 0.137 0.148 0.199 0.316 0.458 0.575
TUN OADR 0.080 0.090 0.114 0.115 0.116 0.147 0.223 0.297 0.412
TUR OADR 0.105 0.093 0.113 0.123 0.126 0.151 0.205 0.279 0.374
ZAF OADR 0.069 0.068 0.065 0.094 0.099 0.113 0.132 0.139 0.174
Note: CHN = China, IND = India, IDN = Indonesia, MYS = Malaysia, PAK = Pakistan, PHL = Philippines,
THA = Thailand (East/SE/South Asia); ARG = Argentina, BRA = Brazil, CHL = Chile, COL = Colombia, MEX =
Mexico, PER = Peru (Latin America); EGY = Egypt, JOR = Jordan, TUN = Tunisia, TUR = Turkey (Middle East
and North Africa); POL = Poland, RUS = Russia and ZAF = South Africa (Other); POADR = prospective old age
dependency ratio, OADR = old-age dependency ratio.
Source: authors calculations based on UNPD 2013.

